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The Army that Never Was: the Unrealistic 1936 Kwantung Army plan 
for an Inner Mongolian Army 
James Boyd, Murdoch University, Australia 
 
Abstract 
Between 1932 and 1945 the Japanese military raised a number of ‘puppet’ armies. 
While research has focused on the motives of those who opted to collaborate with the 
Japanese during the period, little work has been done regarding the composition of these 
forces. This article examines the Kwantung Army’s January 1936 plans for an Inner 
Mongolian Army, and the reasons why this ‘army’ never eventuated in the form that 
had been planned. As such, it sheds light on how officers of the Kwantung Army 
understood, and misunderstood, the potential of peoples of North China to become 
useful collaborators in wresting the region from the Nationalist Chinese control.  
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Introduction 
Following the Kwantung Army’s seizure of Manchuria in September 1931 and the 
creation of the supposedly ‘independent’ state of Manchukuo in March 1932, the need 
for a pliant military force to assist the Imperial Japanese Army in defending its new 
territorial gains became imperative. With the Soviet Union to the north, Soviet-backed 
Mongolian People’s Republic to the northwest and an increasingly fractious Republican 
China to the south, the Kwantung Army, which in 1931 only comprised two divisions 
 
 2 
and numbered around 65,000 men, required additional manpower.
1
 The obvious 
solution to the Japanese military was to raise a Manchukuoan ‘army’.  
The various ‘puppet’ forces raised by the Japanese Army between 1932 and 1945 
have received some scholarly attention. Joyce Lebra’s studies of the Indian National 
Army and the Japanese-trained armies of Southeast Asia are important works in the 
field, while John Boyle’s groundbreaking study of Sino-Japanese collaboration touched 
on the subject of military cooperation among disparate groups.
2
 The focus of works of 
this type, however, is primarily on the reasons why some people in the countries under 
Japanese military control opted to collaborate and not the structure of the forces that the 
Japanese military established. Moreover, the logistical aspect of the ‘puppet’ armies 
raised, that is, the composition of these forces in terms of size and equipment, has 
usually been ignored. This is unfortunate, as an examination of composition of forces 
gives us some idea of how the Japanese military perceived the peoples that fell under its 
control. Moreover, such an examination tells us much about the constraints that 
impacted on the Japanese military’s plans for these forces.  
One reliable way to get some idea of the structure of these ‘puppet’ armies is to 
go back to the plans prepared by the various Japanese Armies that sponsored them and 
compare those with the appraisals made by Western military analysts at the time. This 
material can often be usefully supplemented with a careful reading of contemporary 
civilian sources, both newspapers and books, which often carried quite detailed, 
although not always reliable, reports on the Japanese Imperial Army’s sponsorship of 
‘puppet’ forces. Finally, the work produced recently by writers who could best be 
termed ‘amateurs interested in military affairs’ is also an important source. This group, 
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 3 
often individuals with a military background, has produced a steady stream of works 
examining the Japanese military and the various ‘puppet’ armies that were raised.
3
  
This article examines the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian Army that the 
Kwantung Army planned in January 1936 as a means of extending its military control 
deeper into Republican China. The article first outlines the geopolitical context and then 
examines the Kwantung Army’s plan for this force and considers what equipment the 
force might have received. Finally, the article reviews the actual composition of the 
Inner Mongolian Army and considers why the plan and the reality were so different.  
 
Geopolitical context 
During the Manchukuo period, the Japanese military pursued policies crafted to woo 
both the Mongols of Manchukuo and those living in the region adjacent, especially the 
provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan. Their installation of Puyi, the last Qing emperor, as 
nominal head of state in 1932, and his elevation in 1934 to the position of ‘emperor’ of 
Manchukuo, had important ramifications in this regard, because, as noted by both 
Japanese and Western writers at the time, it increased Puyi’s capacity to serve as a 
rallying-point for those living outside of Manchukuo, both Mongol and Chinese, who 
desired independence from Republican China.
4
 Moreover, in the western part of 
Manchukuo, the area abutting the region still nominally under Republican Chinese 
control, the Japanese authorities established the supposedly autonomous Mongol-
governed Xing’an province where they trumpeted a ‘policy of rule of the Mongols by 
the Mongols’ (Mōjin Mō-ji seisaku), even installing a Mongolian prince, Prince Sai, as 
head of the Xing’an regional administration.
5
 Furthermore, the Japanese military 
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established the Xing’an Brigade, whose personnel were largely drawn from the Mongol 
population. This unit was regarded as one of the most prestigious of the Manchukuoan 
Army and its existence was publicised both inside and outside of Manchukuo.
6
  
The geopolitical situation in which the Kwantung Army planners drafted the plan 
for the proposed Inner Mongolian Army was one beset by competition amongst the 
Nationalist Chinese government and local governors and warlords as well as the 
Japanese military. In this complex power play, the Japanese military wooed Prince De 
(Demchugdongrub) of the Sonid Right banner, in Chahar province, adjacent to 
Manchukuo. De was the leader of a group known as the ‘Young Mongols’, seeking a 
degree of autonomy from the Chinese Republican government.
7
 From 1933 onwards, 
the Japanese military actively pursued De, with a number of Kwantung Army officers 
travelling to the prince’s residence, often offering arms and ammunition in exchange for 
his allegiance. De, for his part, was not averse to meeting with the Japanese, using their 
offers of assistance as a bargaining chip in his dealings with the Republicans. His 
efforts were destined to failure, however, in the face of Chiang Kai-shek’s assiduous 
efforts to keep De’s regional rivals (notably Fu Zuoyi, governor of neighbouring 
Suiyuan province, and his mentor Yan Xishan) on side.
8
 By early 1936, American 
officials in Beijing were advising Washington that it was ‘only a matter of time’ before 
De ‘declared “independence” with Japanese assistance’,
9
 and that the Mongols had been 




The Plan for the Kwantung Army-backed Inner Mongolian Army 
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 5 
In January 1936, as part of its ongoing encroachment into the territory of the Republic 
of China, the Kwantung Army General Staff adopted ‘Tai-Mō (seihoku) shisaku yōryō’ 
(Outline of policy towards Mongolia [the northwest]).
11
 The plan reviewed the current 
military situation as seen by Kwantung Army planners,
12
 and then outlined the military, 
political, economic and cultural measures to be taken to achieve Japanese control of 
Inner Mongolia, and especially the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, a stated objective 
of the army. Steps included the coordination of the Japanese agents within Inner 
Mongolia, in particular the Zenrin Kyōkai (Good Neighbour Association), which had 
been active in the region from 1934 onwards, providing locals with medical care.
13
 The 
population of Inner Mongolia was beset at the time by an array of diseases, including 
eye disease and respiratory problems that would have precluded them from military 
service.
14
 The January 1936 plan echoed earlier Kwantung Army reports that called for 
the provision of medical care to these people, as well as the development of the 
infrastructure of the region in the form of roads, schools and hospitals. Improvements to 
the infrastructure would undoubtedly have facilitated Japanese economic penetration 
there, while the construction of schools and hospitals was a way in which Japanese 
individuals and organisations could be infiltrated into the region.
15
 All of these 
developments would indirectly benefit the Kwantung Army’s planned encroachment.  
After more than seven pages detailing the various non-military agents to be 
connected with Kwantung Army operations, the plan spelled out the proposed structure 
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of an Inner Mongolian Army (Naimōgun).
16
 This force was to be composed of two 
‘armies’ (gun), each with a slightly different structure. The first army was to be made 
up of two cavalry ‘divisions’ (shi), each consisting of three ‘corps’ (dan) and a mortar 
company (hakugekihōtai). The ‘corps’ were broken down into three ‘regiments’ (ren) 
each of 120 men and equipped with two light machine guns per company, with an 
additional machine gun company (kikanjūren) equipped with four heavy machine guns. 
If the plan followed Japanese Army structure at the time, and there is no reason to 
suspect that it did not, the heavy machine gun company would have numbered some 40 
men,
17
 giving each regiment in total some 400 men. This would have meant that one 
cavalry ‘division’ would have numbered around 1250 men, together with the mortar 
company, which with only six mortars numbered no more than 50 men.
18
 The ‘army’ 
was also to have been equipped with a horse artillery unit with eight guns and a tank 
unit with 18 vehicles. The composition of the second ‘army’ was essentially the same, 
although it did not include the tank unit.
19
  
The decision by the Kwantung Army to structure the Inner Mongolian Army 
around cavalry units was probably based on a number of reasons. Firstly, given the vast 
size of Inner Mongolia, a cavalry-based force made greater sense militarily given the 
degree of mobility that was needed to respond to any threat. The reliance on cavalry on 
the Mongolia steppes was not without recent precedent. Baron Roman von Ungern-
Sternberg, the legendary ‘Mad Baron’, whose White Russian forces had harried the Red 
Army in 1920-21, had noted bluntly during his interrogation by his Bolshevik captors 
how, on the ‘difficult Inner Asian terrain’, his ‘cavalry could do battle in any direction 
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Secondly, there was the practical rationale behind the planned army structure, 
probably influenced by the Japanese Army’s combat experience in the region during the 
1918-22 Siberian Intervention and its service alongside the White Russian forces. An 
April 1918 assessment by the Japanese Army of the forces commanded by Grigorii 
Semenov noted that while they were not large, only some 1,800 men, a significant 
proportion comprised cavalry. In addition, Semenov possessed 20 artillery pieces and 
almost 50 machine guns as support weapons,
21
 giving the small force surprising military 
muscle.  
Finally, the Kwantung Army plan may have bought into the romantic image that 
some Japanese had of the Mongols, one that was often constructed around Genghis 
Khan, his horde and horses.
22
 Mongolia and its horses had been promoted to the 
Japanese public since the late 1920s, a campaign in which the Japanese military was 
actively involved.
23
 Genghis Khan aside, the type of horse bred in this region was 
especially sturdy, renowned for its stamina, and able to travel long distances in a day,
24
 
and thus ideal mounts for the cavalry based force that the Kwantung Army envisioned. 
The Kwantung Army planners, however, seduced by the romantic image of Genghis 
Khan and his horsemen, set unrealistic expectations, discussed more fully below, as to 
what the Mongols were capable of achieving in the short period of time allowed for the 
Inner Mongolian Army to be raised, trained and readied for action. 
With two cavalry divisions in each ‘army’, the Inner Mongolian Army was 
planned as a force of around 5000 men, a figure that does not include the manpower 
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 8 
needed for the horse artillery units and tank unit that the armies were also to encompass. 
These units, together with some form of headquarters component, would have 
accounted for at least a further 500 men, giving the planned army around 5,500 
personnel. In addition to manpower, the intended supply of 36 light machine guns, 24 
heavy machine guns and 12 mortars, together with the horse artillery and tank unit, 
would have made it a comparatively well-equipped ‘puppet’ force.  
While it is not possible to state with certainty what weaponry the force received, 
as the plan was not that detailed, from examining period photos it is possible to suggest 
what the fully-equipped army might have looked like. In September 1937, for example, 
following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese press highlighted the 
role of the cavalry of the Inner Mongolian Army in the campaign.
25
 The photo that 
accompanied the report showed two Inner Mongolian Army cavalrymen mounted on 
their sturdy horses and dressed in uniforms almost identical to those worn by the 
Japanese Army (see Figure 1). The only pieces of equipment that marked the men as not 
being Japanese soldiers are the brassard that can be seen on the upper left arm, 
presumably to indicate that the men were Mongols, and the bandolier and waist pouches 
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FIGURE 1. Mongol cavalry in Japanese service, September 1937, 
reproduced in Nagoshi, Shōwa no sensō kinenkan dai-ikkan, 127. 
 
A second photo, said to show Inner Mongolian Army soldiers in 1936, presents a 
far more motley assortment of individuals dressed in traditional Mongol garb and 
carrying an array of weapons (see Figure 2). Of interest, however, is that while the 
group is mostly armed with antiquated rifles, at least two of the soldiers are carrying the 
Czech ZB-26 light machine gun.
27
 The ZB-26 was a highly successful design, which 
influenced the design of the British Army’s Bren gun, and was widely exported during 
the 1920s and 1930s. How these Inner Mongolians came by them is unknown. There 
was, however, a thriving arms trade in China about this time, as arms dealers and gun 
runners flocked to the country to ply their trade, resulting in just about every type of 
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FIGURE 2. Inner Mongolian Army c.1936, reproduced in Jowett, Rays of 
the Rising Sun, 51. The men second from the left and third from the right 
are equipped with the ZB-26. 
 
In terms of the artillery that the Inner Mongolian Army might have had been 
given, a segment of a 1942 Japanese propaganda film documenting Japanese Army 
operations in Inner Mongolia and, specifically, the part played by the Inner Mongolian 
Army in assisting the operations against Chinese ‘bandits’, shows a group of Inner 
Mongolian soldiers using a light artillery piece,
29
 in all likelihood a Model 11 (1922) 
37-mm gun. Although not a large bore piece, the gun would have given the small Inner 
Mongolian Army a weapon that fired both high explosive and armour-piercing 
ammunition, making it an efficient infantry close support weapon.
30
  
While such light weaponry could have been supplied, the provision of any 
armoured vehicles would seem unlikely, given that the Kwantung Army never had 
sufficient armoured vehicles to equip its own units, let alone ‘puppet’ forces. The larger 
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Manchukuoan Army, for example, had to make do with an odd assortment of vehicles 
salvaged from the equipment that had been used by Zhang Xueliang’s pre-1931 army, 
mostly World War I vintage tanks, and it was not until 1943 that it received a small 
number of obsolete Japanese tanks.
31
  
That the Inner Mongolian Army did receive tanks is supported by several sources. 
Firstly, in a November 1936 Chinese press report some credence was given to the belief 
that the Inner Mongolian Army possessed tanks. The article was based in part on an 
interview given by Major-General Kita Seichi, then the Japanese Military Attaché in 
Shanghai. In this interview Kita declared ‘reports that these Mongols are too poor to 
buy tanks, armored cars and munitions are untrue’.
32
 While press reports at the time, 
particularly those from the Chinese press, must be viewed with caution, Matsui Tadao, 
one of the Japanese Army officers assigned to the Inner Mongolian Army, also noted 
the provision of armour to the Inner Mongolians at this time in his postwar memoirs.
33
  
Of the light armoured vehicles used by the Kwantung Army at the time, the most 
likely contender for service with the Inner Mongolian Army was the Type 92 cavalry 
tank. Manufactured in relatively small quantities between 1933 and 1935, this lightly 
armoured vehicle, equipped only with machine guns, saw service in Manchuria and 
North China, but was already being phased out at the time that the Inner Mongolian 
Army was being planned. With a top speed of 40 kilometres an hour and an operating 
range of around 100 kilometres, the small vehicle would have been able to work 
alongside the Inner Mongolian cavalry.
34
 It is also tempting to suggest that the fact that 
the Type 92 was a ‘cavalry’ tank might have influenced the Kwantung Army planners.  
Ultimately, the force that the January 1936 Kwantung Army plan detailed was 
well balanced, with a mix of cavalry, horse artillery and tanks that could have numbered 
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around 5,500 men. It was not a large force by any measure but, with the mix of light 
and heavy equipment, it would have been a force to be reckoned with on the North 
China battlefield when placed against some of the ragtag units fielded at the time by the 
Chinese Republican Army. However, when the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian 
Army’s attempt to wrest control of part of Suiyuan province from the Republic of China 
got underway in November 1936, in what came to be known as the Suiyuan Incident, 
the Inner Mongolian force that went into battle was not the well-balanced unit that had 
been proposed.   
 
The Outcome – What Went Wrong in the Suiyuan invasion?  
The Inner Mongolian Army assembled by the Kwantung Army was far less effective 
than the force which had been initially planned, numbering instead 4 units of around 
16,000 personnel in total. Instead of the initially planned force, it was an unwieldy mix 
of Mongol, Manchukuoan and Han Chinese, largely comprising mounted irregulars the 
reliability of whom was seriously doubted by some of the Japanese Army officers 
associated with the operation. In fact, the Manchukuoans were Han Chinese, but the 
Japanese military applied the term ‘Manchukuoan’ to the Han Chinese of Manchuria to 
imply that they were in some way different to the Han Chinese living outside of 
Manchukuo. Three of the four units were a composed of this personnel. It was the 
fourth unit that comprised of the fledgling first and second Inner Mongolian Armies, 
which had been enlarged and now numbered some 11,000 personnel. Exactly how the 
Japanese were able to raise an army double the size of what had originally been planned 
is unclear, but it seems likely that it was done by drafting recruits who were less well-
trained and of dubious loyalty. The commander of the second army was Li Shouxin, a 
Sinicized Mongol and former colonel in the Rehe provincial army, whose troops had 
performed well during operations in Chahar in December 1935 and were considered 
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reliable by the Kwantung Army.
35
 The Chahar operations had seen Li’s force occupy 
the eastern part of the province, just north of Zhangjiakou, and, as the US military 
attaché noted, place the ‘Japanese astride the Kalgan [Zhangjiakou]-Urga road …, in a 
better position to exercise influence over Shansi [Shanxi] and Suiyuan’.
36
 Finally, as 
had been done during the Chahar operation, the Kwantung Army raised an independent 
air unit by drafting about 60 men from the Manchukuo Airline Corporation to provide 
air support for the operation.
37
  
The Republican Chinese force opposing this mixed Mongol, Manchukuoan and 
Han Chinese force was significantly larger, numbering around 45,000 men.
38
 Indeed, 
when the Inner Mongolian Army was committed to battle in November 1936 it was 
soundly beaten. The Suiyuan Incident has been examined in a number of existing 
works,
39
 so I will confine my remarks here to the impact that the defeat had on the 
broader Sino-Japanese conflict. The spirited response of the forces of Fu Zuoyi, the 
Chinese warlord who controlled Suiyuan province, struck a chord with the Chinese 
population, and the Chinese press reported widely on Fu’s success.
40
 This led to calls 
from across Chinese society for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan’s 
encroachments on Chinese territory. Moreover, the unexpected success that the Chinese 
forces had against the Inner Mongolian army, which the Chinese press implied was 
actually the Kwantung Army, may have indirectly triggered the December 1936 
kidnapping of Chiang by Zhang Xueliang, the former ruler of Manchuria, in the well-
known Xi’an Incident. Writing later of his decision to seize Chiang, Zhang specifically 
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mentioned the Suiyuan invasion as one of the reasons for his action.
41
 Kwantung Army 
Vice Chief of Staff Kawabe Torashirō concluded independently that the Suiyuan 
invasion had prompted the kidnapping.
42
 By seeking to gain control of Inner Mongolia, 
the Kwantung Army inadvertently prompted a rapprochement between the Guomindang 




This begs the question of what went wrong between the tabling of the Kwantung 
Army’s plan for an Inner Mongolian Army in January 1936 and the launch of the 
Suiyuan operation later that year. In the space of some 11 months, the plan for a small 
but well-balanced military force had morphed into a larger but far more unwieldy entity 
composed of a mix of racial groups, some of whom were unreliable, which was soundly 
defeated when it went into action. Much of the reason why the force that was 
established was defeated lies with the Kwantung Army planners who, carried away with 
their mythology of the Mongol horsemen, underestimated what was needed to raise, 
train and equip such an army. It seems to me that there are four major reasons why the 
planned army never eventuated. 
First, while the armies commanded by Genghis Khan were comparable to a 
modern force in terms of ‘maneuverability, firepower, discipline and excellent officer 
corps’,
44
 and although contemporary Mongolians such as Li Shouxin had demonstrated 
talent in combat, there was an unbridgeable gap between the unrealistic expectations of 
the Kwantung Army planners and what the Inner Mongolians of the early twentieth 
century were capable of achieving.  
A modern army requires trained officers and non-commissioned officers to direct 
it in battle, and those personnel were lacking. The need to develop such a cadre had 
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been recognised at the beginning of the twentieth century, with at least one Inner 
Mongolian prince establishing a military school staffed by Japanese military personnel 
at his banner administration.
45
 The school was largely unsuccessful, however, and one 
of the first things the Japanese military had to do in the early 1930s was to dispatch a 
small group of Mongolian students to Japan to undergo military schooling.
46
 These 
students then served as trainers at the military school at Zhangbei in Chahar that the 
Japanese military established and which by June 1936 had about 500 Mongolian youths 
undergoing training.
47
 To effectively staff the planned army, however, this school 
needed to turn out 12 captains, 36 lieutenants and 108 noncommissioned officers of 
various grades,
48
 something that would have been impossible to do in the amount of 
time available. Japanese Army infantry officer candidates undertook six to 11 months 
training at officers’ school followed by service with a field unit on probation for four 
months, but this was usually after graduating from a military preparatory school, while 




The Kwantung Army planners would have been fully aware of the time needed to 
train a reliable officer and NCO corps, and for them to proceed regardless is clear 
evidence of unrealistic expectations on their part. One possible source of trained 
personnel would have been from the Manchukuoan Army’s Xing’an Brigade mentioned 
earlier, who, being predominantly Mongol and already trained, might have provided an 
ideal boost to the officer and NCO cadre of the fledgling Inner Mongolian Army. There 
was, however, no suggestion in the January 1936 plan that seconding personnel from 
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the Xing’an Brigade was considered, an indication of how little exchange there was 
between the Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian armies at the time.  
The second reason why the planned army never eventuated relates to the size of 
the Inner Mongolian population. It is often forgotten that there is a direct relationship 
between the size of the armed force that a country is capable of supporting and the size 
of its population. In January 1936 the population of the area under direct control of the 
Kwantung Army was probably no more than half a million people,
50
 which was most 
likely why the Japanese military were forced to pad the Inner Mongolian force with 
Manchukuoan irregulars. Indeed, at the time of the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident, the beginning of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war, the Soviet-backed army of 
the Mongolian People’s Republic numbered less than 12,000 personnel recruited from a 
population of slightly more than 800,000.
51
  
A third reason why the planned army never eventuated had to do with the 
availability of equipment. As noted earlier, the Japanese Army never had enough heavy 
weapons to adequately equip its own units, making the prospect of supplying modern 
weaponry to a ‘puppet’ force highly improbable. Looking at what the larger 
Manchukuoan Army had to make do with, it seems likely that Kwantung Army planners 
baulked at supplying the Inner Mongolian Army with modern weapons that would have 
had to have come from their own limited supply.  
Finally, the reason why the planned army was neither well equipped nor trained 
might have been a combination of impatience and overconfidence on the part of the 
Kwantung Army. In September 1931, the Kwantung Army, numbering some 25,000 
personnel, was able to defeat Zhang Xueliang’s forces, possibly ten times its size, and 
seize control of the three provinces of Manchuria.
52
 That was not an isolated success. In 
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January 1933, for example, when the Kwantung Army looked to seize Rehe province 
and incorporate it into the new ‘nation’ of Manchukuo, a force of some 20,000 Japanese 
supported by 42,000 personnel of the Manchukuoan Army, had subjugated the province 
in less than two months.
53
 At this time there had been (theoretically) 100,000 Chinese 
soldiers to defend Rehe.
54
  
The apparent weakness of the various Chinese armies that the Kwantung Army 
faced, combined with the initial performance of the Manchukuoan Army, may have 
lulled Kwantung Army planners into believing that they could encroach more deeply on 
Chinese territory using largely ‘puppet’ forces with small amounts only of additional 
support. Indeed, this is what was done in December 1935 when forces commanded by 
Li Shouxin launched an attack from Dolonor on districts in the south of Chahar 
province. Li’s force, which only numbered some 5000 personnel, supported by a small 
number of Japanese aircraft and possibly a few tanks, was able to capture the region 





 The apparent success of such a small force, albeit one supported 
by aircraft and tanks, may have convinced Kwantung Army planners that to seize 
Suiyuan they would not require a significantly larger force.  
This apparent overconfidence on the part of the Kwantung Army planners was 
consistent with a widespread underestimation of Chinese military strength. Throughout 
the period the widely held perception of the average Chinese soldier, both within China 
and abroad, was that he was either a village yokel, unable to avoid being swept up by 
whichever warlord was recruiting, or the scum of the civilian world, unsuited for any 
other kind of employment.
56
 That such was the contempt with which the average 
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Chinese soldier was held in Japan can be gauged from the manner in which the 
magazine Ie no hikari (Light of the Home), a magazine for women, portrayed the 
Chinese soldier. In its stories the average Chinese soldier was lazy, cowardly, ignorant 
and inept at fighting, as well as effete, because when it rained he fought from under his 
umbrella so as not to get his uniform wet.
57
 Denigrating the enemy is a standard trope; 
witness the American contempt for the Japanese soldier as ‘scrawny, near-sighted, and 
poorly trained and equipped’ prior to the start of the Second World War.
58
 Nevertheless, 
if a Japanese women’s magazine viewed Chinese soldiery in this negative light, one can 
imagine how the Japanese military perceived them.  
 
Conclusion 
While the Inner Mongolian Army that the Kwantung Army envisioned in its January 
1936 plan never came into existence, the plan illustrates the extent to which Japanese 
military officers connected with its development were willing to go in the pursuit of 
control of the region. In particular, the plan illustrates that the Kwantung Army was 
thinking, to some extent, about the changes that were needed in Inner Mongolia to 
facilitate the formation of the proposed army. While some might argue that the planned 
force was merely a ‘pipe dream’ and that there was never any likelihood of it actually 
eventuating, I believe this was not the case. The evidence that is available from 
photographs and film taken after July 1937 suggests that the Kwantung Army did 
continue to equip the Inner Mongolians, seeking to implement its January 1936 plan, 
even if the army that eventuated was not what had been initially envisaged.   
The Kwantung Army had in mind a compact, well balanced force in terms of ratio 
of fire power to manpower. In the end, however, they were unsuccessful because of the 
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reasons of unrealistic expectations, which led to insufficient time to develop a cadre of 
trained officers and personnel, as well as insufficient population numbers to support the 
planned force, a lack of available equipment, given the demands of the Imperial 
Japanese Army at that time, and impatience and overconfidence on the part of the 
Kwantung Army itself. If the Kwantung Army had been able to assemble, train and 
equip the force it had planned in January 1936 then the outcome of the November 1936 
Suiyuan Incident might have been different. The smaller Inner Mongolian ‘army’ would 
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